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We demonstrate how the 5G network slicing model can be enhanced to address data security requirements.
In this work we demonstrate two different slice configurations, with different encryption requirements,
representing two diverse use-cases for 5G networking – namely, an enterprise application hosted at a
metro network site, and a content delivery network.
We create a modified software-defined networking (SDN) orchestrator which calculates and provisions
network slices according to the requirements, including encryption backed by quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD), or other methods. Slices are automatically provisioned by SDN orchestration of network
resources, allowing selection of encrypted links as appropriate, including those which use encryption
with standard Diffie-Hellman key exchange, QKD or quantum-resistant algorithms (QRAs), as well as no
encryption at all. We show that the set-up and tear-down times of the network slices takes of the order
of 1-2 minutes, which is at least an order of magnitude improvement over manually provisioning a link
today. © 2020 Optical Society of America
http://dx.doi.org/10.1364/ao.XX.XXXXXX
1. INTRODUCTION
The recent introduction of 5G networks for commercial use
promises to deliver increased bandwidth to customers, enabling
faster speed connections, as well as lower-latency communica-
tions, the ability to meet Quality of Service demands, and many
other service improvements. This opens up the possibility for
far greater connectivity of devices than ever before.
The benefits brought by 5G are as a result of the converged
architecture, which is the core of 5G networks; resources are
placed as close to the edge of the network as possible (i.e. as
far away from the core network as can be), thus offering lower-
latency services via so-called edge-computing [1]. Making use
of the placement of the resources at the edge of the network, and
the fact that these resources are used more efficiently (with some
sharing of compute resource, for example), are use-cases such
as content delivery networks (CDNs) and edge-compute, auto-
mated vehicles and remote operations, as well as the monitoring
and control of large-scale Internet of Things (IoT) networks, such
as smart meters and distributed power generation.
Due to the fact that there are a wide variety of new use-
cases which are enabled by 5G technology, the network has
had to be designed such that it can cope with a wide range of
heterogeneous requirements, such as latency, reliability, security,
and more. Consequently, network slicing[2] is utilised, and plays
a key role within making 5G networks suitably flexible [3].
By effectively multiplexing separate virtualised networks
over common physical infrastructure, network slices are made,
and can be provisioned with different resources. For example,
a network slice providing communications for an automated
vehicle will require very low latency, but a fairly low bandwidth,
compared to high-definition video streaming which is more
reliant on large bandwidth and less on latency [4]. Both of these
use-cases can be delivered on the same physical infrastructure
by separating these into separate virtualised networks through
network slicing.
Network slicing is reliant on software-defined networking
(SDN) and network function virtualisation (NFV). The use of
SDN in transport networks is already a well-researched topic [5]
and extending the concept for use in 5G networks has already
been considered [6]. NFV allows network slices to be made
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Fig. 1. A generic schematic to illustrate network slicing, orchestrated by a network slice controller within an exemplar 5G network
[2, 8].
via virtual machines (VMs), which are then connected together
across the network via SDN orchestration [7]; SDN is used to
flexibly configure network slices, as well as reserving resources
for the wide range of use-cases possible via orchestration carried
about by a network slice controller (as illustrated in Fig. 1).
This SDN orchestration is vital within this work, as it is used to
dynamically control the type of encryption deployed for each
network slice.
5G networks often provide some encryption of traffic, for
example between the user equipment and the eNodeB, or to
the Secure Gateway (SeGW). In general, however, they may
not provide intrinsic encryption of data traffic between the end
user and cloud applications, instead relying on over-the-top
encrypted sessions in the application layer. This often places a
responsibility on the end user and/or application developer to
maintain security. [7]. Application layer encryption of traffic will
always be an important method to obtain end-to-end security,
but 5G networks involve critical links within the tiered resources
over which large concentrations of secure application traffic may
flow, such as between the aggregation and metro nodes. These
critical links could be attractive targets for eavesdroppers; and so
we suggest that network operators consider providing intrinsic
Layer 1 (L1) encryption for them. Providing L1 encryption, as in
this paper, also reduces the opportunity for an eavesdropper to
perform traffic analysis using packet headers.
A vital prerequisite for strong encryption is secure key ex-
change. Today’s standard key exchange algorithms (such as
Diffie-Hellman and RSA) are thought to be vulnerable to attacks
by large-scale quantum computers. As such, there are two pos-
sible routes for avoiding this future threat: quantum-resistant
algorithms (QRAs), such as those being developed under the
NIST program [9], and quantum key distribution (QKD).
Whereas QRAs for key exchange would be reliant on strong
mathematical testing and/or proofs to safeguard against the
increased compute power of a large-scale quantum computer,
QKD is based upon the fundamental laws of quantum physics,
and if implemented properly is secure against any future compu-
tational threat. QKD utilises quantum states encoded on photons
to agree a key between users with information theoretic secu-
rity (ITS). ITS implies that we are able to calculate the statistical
likelihood that an eavesdropper holds any information on the
key, and show that this has been reduced to an infinitesimally
small probability. We emphasise that QKD is secure against
any future computational threat, be that classical or quantum,
whereas QRAs may be insecure against a future quantum hack-
ing algorithm, which is yet to be discovered.
QKD requires an initial authentication step, which may be
based on symmetric authentication where pre-shared key ex-
ists, but if this is not the case then other approaches, such as
authentication algorithms based on QRAs, may be needed for
this first-time authentication. If an asymmetric algorithm is used
for the initial authentication step - even standard PKI - then the
time-window of vulnerability of this authentication is limited, as
once a key has been established using QKD it does not then mat-
ter if the initial authentication is subsequently broken, because
the QKD key material has no algorithmic link to the material
that was used to authenticate the QKD exchange.
To protect data for which there is a need for privacy or intellec-
tual property retention over a time-scale of years, we anticipate
that network application designers will select a cryptographic
suite based on QRAs. However, for valuable and/or sensitive
data, further long-term key security can be provided by QKD
for key exchange, in combination with QRAs for encryption
and authentication. Sections of a single network slice may have
different security requirements, for example where data is time
sensitive and cached within the network, such as in CDNs, or
where data from multiple devices is aggregated; the level of
security is another parameter of the connection which it would
be useful to be able to control as part of a network slice. In this
way, we create the capability to dynamically control the type of
encryption used for separate data channels in 5G networks.
Using network slicing to control encryption is relatively
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Fig. 2. The network test-bed configuration for the implementation of 5G network slicing, with varying levels of security provided.
novel, but nevertheless has already been considered theoret-
ically in [10] and [11] by utilising QKD in tandem with a QRA
(specifically, a QRA version of Elliptic-Curve Cryptography),
and has also performed experimentally over the Bristol City 5G
UK Test Network in the works of [12–14], by applying QKD to
5G networking. Moreover, in [15], proof-of-transit of the 5G data
traffic is demonstrated, using cryptographic techniques with
QKD over the Madrid Quantum Network [16] – this network
has also been used to demonstrate securing the management of
the SDN control plane through QKD in [17, 18]. However, what
differentiates our work is that we dynamically control the type
of encryption – Diffie-Hellman+AES, QRA+AES, QKD+AES, or
no encryption at all – to address the realistic scenario in which
different data packets in a 5G network will have varying security
requirements. We note here that the symmetric encryption algo-
rithm used in this work is the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) with 256 bit keys, from QKD, Diffie-Hellman or a QRA
for key exchange. AES-256 is currently thought to be "quantum-
safe"[9], in that even a large-scale quantum computer will be
unable to crack this method of encryption with an exponential
speed-up, unlike Diffie-Hellman or RSA asymmetric algorithms
which are susceptible to this type of cryptanalysis.
Within this work we experimentally demonstrate 5G net-
work slicing to dynamically control the type of encryption (and
therefore the level of data security) over existing commercial
telecommunications infrastructure, to represent the possibility of
supporting the variety of potential new use-cases born through
5G networks, which will inevitably have diverse security re-
quirements. More specifically, we test an experimental proof-of-
concept of two potential use-cases – an enterprise application
hosted at a metro site in the network, and a CDN use-case.
This paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we describe
our 5G network topology and design, and methodology behind
our proof of concept demonstration, before discussing the re-
sults in Section 3. Section 3 is divided into subsections in which
we first address the two network slice configurations separately
(Subsections A and B), before moving to present results regard-
ing the timing (namely the provision and deprovision times) of
each network slice in Subsection C.
2. NETWORK CONFIGURATION
Within this section we describe the network set-up behind the
test-bed configuration of our 5G network slicing prototype, with
dynamically-controlled encryption.
Fig. 2 schematically describes the architecture of the repre-
sentative network test-bed used within this work. There are
four node types in this network – cell, aggregation, metro, and
core. Traffic flows from the cell sites to the core site, via use
of Ethernet switches and optical switches to switch data chan-
nels between links using different forms of encryption (note
that the links required carry the quantum channel to establish
QKD were static, which avoided lengthy restartup times that
are often incurred with QKD systems). In this work we use the
UKQNtel infrastructure, which is a section of the UK Quantum
Network, containing intermediate trusted nodes for QKD link
handover and classical amplification (for further detail, see [19]),
as this has QKD-capable networking over a 121 km link from
BT Research Labs in Ipswich (Adastral Park) to Cambridge. As
described in [19], this link consists of four QKD sections, linked
by 3 trusted nodes held in BT exchanges, and an end-to-end key
is established by passing a key (here generated by a QRNG) over
each QKD section using one-time-pad encryption, where it is
relayed to the far endpoint via the trusted nodes. Available for
interconnections over this infrastructure are 5×100G channels
on a coherent dense wave-division multiplexing (DWDM) sys-
tem looped back over the 121 km optical fibre link (242 km in
total – see Fig. 2).
Each of the five 100G channels within this link provides
10×10G client Ethernet ports, and all interconnections between
5G network sites are 10G. There is no segregation of encryption
between 10G clients on the same 100G channel (one encryption
key per 100G channel, refreshed at 3s intervals). This refresh
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rate of 3s is not a requirement, however we are refreshing as
fast as reliably possible to demonstrate optimum performance,
and this corresponds to 300 Gb of data per key. In other imple-
mentations it might be preferred to have a separate encryption
key per client port, but this would not affect the principle of
the Network Slicing Orchestrator approach demonstrated here.
The network testbed could be extended to provide links secured
with keys derived from a combination of exchange methods (for
example a key derived from a cryptographic hash function on 2
or more constituent keys from different methods such as QKD
and QRA). However, the main purpose of this work was a proof
of concept of the dynamic provision of L1 connections from links
with different physical and security characteristics, and so we
did not provision links to use combinations of keys at this stage,
although we note that the latest version of the 10-TCE-AES card
can internally derive a key from a combination of DH and a
QKD key received from an external QKD system.
Three channels are configured to provide: no encryption;
standard Diffie-Hellman key exchange with Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard (DH+AES); a prototype QRA for key exchange,
specifically an NTRU implementation provided by the Open-
QuantumSafe library [20] with AES (QRA+AES). The remain-
ing two 100G channels are in the default configuration for the
UKQNtel link (256 bit AES, with keys provided via QKD, re-
ferred to herein as QKD+AES, using the Clavis 3 ID Quan-
tique QKD devices). Two exemplary network circuit schematics
are shown in Fig. 3 to illustrate the specific connectivity be-
tween Adastral Park and Cambridge with the various encryp-
tion schemes utilised in this work. In this case, a modified test
firmware for the card was supplied by ADVA together with
a primary/secondary SSH script for retrieving and refreshing
AES keys used by the 10-TCE cards with from a third party
system, which was a proof-of-concept key management system
running as a TCP service and implemented on Centos 6.2. The
key management system holds caches of each type of key (e.g.
QKD, QRA), managed by key ID. Each client port pair on the
10-TCE-AES cards was configured statically to use a particular
key exchange method, and the SDN algorithm therefore had
Fig. 3. Exemplary network diagrams to show the connectivity from the Adastral Park and Cambridge network nodes, illustrating
the use of various encryption methods: a) QKD+AES encryption, b) DH+AES or QRA+AES encryption. The wavelengths of the
various channels are denoted as follows: λMGMT = management wavelength, λDISC = QKD discussion channel wavelength, λQ
= quantum key transmission wavelength. OTN = optical transport network, mux/demux = wavelength division multiplexing
(WDM) multiplexer/demultiplexer.
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Fig. 4. Layers of network control within this experiment, showing the orchestrator, controller and device layers and the interfaces
between them.
Fig. 5. Network configurations of a) Use-Case 1, representing an enterprise app hosted at a network metro site, and b) Use-Case 2,
representing a content delivery network (CDN), hosted at the network aggregation site.
a limited set of encrypted links using each key type to select
between, and did not dynamically reconfigure the type of key
used on each link.
The ADVA 10-TCE encryption cards that were used for data
transmission have two available models: one which supports
encryption (10-TCE-AES, see Fig. 3), and one which does not
(10-TCE). The resource limitations on encrypted links are there-
fore dependent on the hardware available. Similarly, adding
QKD to an encrypted link is limited by available installed hard-
ware, however, it may be possible to route traffic which does
not strictly require encryption over free encrypted links. The
delay introduced by the 10-TCE-AES is 15 µs (4 µs in the card,
and 11 µs in the CFP module which applies Forward Error Cor-
rection) - this figure is the same for both the 10-TCE and 10-TCE-
AES (encrypted) card.
To demonstrate the ability of our orchestrator to create very
diverse network slice requirements we added a further illus-
trative variation, namely between DH+AES and QRA+AES.
However, in practice a network operator would likely select
a network policy which always applies one, or both, of these
techniques in addition to available QKD hardware. We view
the QKD+AES encrypted links as offering the highest level of
security, and note that in some implementations, since the main
extra cost is for the QKD hardware, these may be implemented
as QKD plus another method of key exchange in a single link.
Central to this experiment is the use of SDN control and or-
chestration technologies. All of the network devices utilised
within this demo have a YANG device model, and their con-
figuration can be changed by issuing requests via a NETCONF
interface. The standard YANG model of the optical and Ether-
net switches have been used without any extensions. Network
devices are registered with a single instance of the Cisco Net-
work Services Orchestrator which acts as the SDN Controller,
and the orchestrator communicates with the SDN controller via
a REST-API. The hierarchy of the different control layers used
in this experiment is illustrated in Fig. 4. Each slice is broken
down into three connections: cell site to core site (for control
plane traffic), cell site to compute site, and compute site to core
site. To achieve the required network flexibility, Layer 2 (L2)
switches are used at each site. The optical switch at the metro
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site provides necessary flexibility for allocation of the links with
different security levels to different tasks.
This approach allows a network operator to specify the prop-
erties of the new network slice required, through a portal or
application programmable interface (API). The entity providing
this is a custom Network Slicing Orchestrator, which has been
modified to include security requirements in both the network
slice descriptor and what the underlying network can provide.
The Network Slicing Orchestrator has the full end-to-end view
of the network and understands the requirements for network
slices, as well as performing the routing and resource allocation.
For each connection in a slice, the required security level
(non-encrypted, DH+AES, QKD+AES or QRA+AES is specified,
along with more traditional slice parameters such as bandwidth,
latency and compute requirements. Once the properties for a
slice are submitted, the Network Slicing Orchestrator determines
a suitable route through the network and checks whether suffi-
cient network and compute resource are available, whilst also
ensuring that the links selected meet the security requirements
specified in the initial slice request. The orchestrator achieves
this by allocating a security metric to each link which then is
used as part of the path computation element. The network op-
erator can then submit their request for the slice to be activated
and the orchestrator then issues the configuration commands to
the network devices.
3. RESULTS & DISCUSSION
We trialled two use-cases for 5G network slicing encryption. Two
slice configurations are shown in Fig. 5, based on use-cases, and
in the following subsections we discuss the network topology
of each use-case separately before moving to present further
results.
A. Use-Case 1: Enterprise App
Use-Case 1 is an enterprise app hosted at the metro site. The
enterprise app processes data coming from user equipment (UE)
which is connected to the cell sites.
The link from each cell site to the metro site is secured with
post-quantum security via use of a QRA, a solution which scales
well. Premium QKD+AES encryption is selected for the link
which passes aggregated data from the metro site to the mobile
core node; this could be a prime target for a malicious eaves-
dropper, and therefore would benefit the most from the highest
level of data security. Standard software-based key-exchange
algorithms (Diffie-Hellman implemented within TLS 1.2) are
chosen as sufficient to protect the control plane, operating from
the cell site to the core site, which is considered to require only
short-lived security of encryption.
B. Use-Case 2: CDN
Use-Case 2 is a CDN, in which the delivery sites are placed close
to the network edge, at aggregation sites, in order to reduce the
load within the core of the network. The scenario is that sensitive
data (such as pre-released video content or software packages)
is delivered securely to the CDN, and an eavesdropper would
place high value in retrieving this data ahead of the official
release.
The delivery of the content to the CDN is via an encrypted
link based on QKD, while no encryption is provisioned between
the aggregation node and the cell site, since after the data has
been released it no longer needs to be protected. Again, we
deploy standard DH+AES key exchange and encryption to the
control plane traffic, from the cell site to the core site, as we did
for Use-Case 1.
C. Timing
Fig. 6 shows histograms to quantify the time taken to set-up
(provision) and tear-down (deprovision) the network slices, in
both use-cases.
Fig. 6 shows that the distribution of times to set-up and tear
down each of the two slices is, in each use-case, between 1 and
2 minutes. Comparing this to the time it would take a skilled
network engineer to design a service and manually configure
each individual device or system of an already existing network
which would typically be measured in hours, this is a significant
improvement that is a benefit to telecommunications operators.
In Use-Case 2 the slice takes longer to provision/deprovision
as it has an additional network element to provision (namely, a
metro node Ethernet switch), which is not needed in Use-Case 1.
Each network configuration step is made in sequence (see
swim lane diagram for a provisioning operation, Fig. 7), allow-
ing for efficient roll-back if there is a problem. This sequential
build-up of the slice increases the time taken to set it up (there
is no parallel allocation or configuration of resources), but since
the network configuration is locked by the orchestrator which
only allows one change at a time, this approach would reduce
race conditions and conflicts if this system were to be extended
to support multiple simultaneous slice requests.
4. CONCLUSION
As highlighted throughout this work, there are use-cases within
network slicing and 5G networks that would greatly benefit
from flexible selection of network encryption. Two such use-
cases we demonstrate in this work are metro-site-hosted enter-
prise apps and content delivery networks, however there are
many potential applications such as CAVs (connected and au-
tomated vehicles) communications, smart factories, connecting
distributed research facilities with high-value intellectual prop-
erty, and more. Moreover, the dynamic nature of this work also
lends itself to applications with time variable demand, such
as setting-up highly secure links for daily, or more frequent,
back-up of data.
In this implementation, the provisioned links have static se-
curity parameters (i.e. type of encryption and key-exchange),
and selection is made from the available static links. There is
a parallel with the static nature of other parameters of links,
such as latency and bandwidth. However, this design could
be further developed such that those links that support encryp-
tion could be dynamically configured to select algorithms and
key-exchange methods. Such ‘cryptoagility’ could improve pro-
visioning and response times, e.g. applying critical updates to
address newly discovered vulnerabilities, or provisioning a se-
cure link to meet particular security requirements. However,
the design principles involved with rapid dynamic changes to
cryptographic protocols on a network link are a topic for further
research as there is a risk that the flexibility could also introduce
vulnerabilities.
For future-proof security, the secure link options will need to
include quantum-safe methods such as the quantum-resistant al-
gorithms selected by the NIST post-quantum cryptography pro-
gram, and QKD as demonstrated here, such that the customer,
or network operator, is able to select the encryption level accord-
ingly, based on the type of traffic. The security requirements
of a 5G application can be included in the resource selection
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Fig. 6. Histograms showing slice set-up times over 100 runs. a) Use-Case 1 provision times, and b) deprovision times, c) Use-Case 2
provision times, and d) deprovision times.
criteria of a 5G Network Slicing Orchestrator. This approach
could help operators make maximum utilisation of premium
security resources such as high speed, encrypted links and QKD.
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Fig. 7. Swim lane diagram showing the interactions between the different entities for a provisioning operation.
